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THE- PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN NEBRASKA
David Dow*
and
Gregory D. Erwin*
In the spring of 1964 the United States Supreme Court de-
cided a group of cases which raise serious -questions concerning
the application of the privilege against self-incrimination in the
states.' It is the purpose of this article to, suggest the changes
which were thereby made in the application of the Privilege-
2
in Nebraska, and to consider some of the problems that remain for
solution. It is not the intention of the authors to deal with these
matters in great depth, but rather to provide a quick summary.
After all, the literature dealing with the Privilege is so extensive
that it should be largely unnecessary to do more than refer to the
cases that control and the authorities that do discuss the various
issues.
In the first place it is clear that the Privilege is recognized in
every American jurisdiction.3 Until 1964 it was also clear that
the application of the Privilege was almost unanimously agreed to
be a "matter of state concern:--that is, each state was free to
develop its own riLas govetnihg the extent and application of its
own Privilege. In other words, the fifth amendment provi-
sion of the United States Constitution 4 had never been applied to
control. state action. It is true .some commentators argued that
the decisions had never held the fifth amendment was not appli-
cable to state procedures (except in very special situations) and
many foretold the recent decision in Malloy v. Hogan. In that
case the Supreme Court specifically held that the fifth amendment
* A.B. 1933, J.D. 1936, University of Michigan; Member, Nebraska and
American Bar Association; Dean, University of Nebraska College of
Law 1960-19_-.
"* J.D. 1965, University of Nebraska.
1 Griffin v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Habor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1: (1964)'; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2 Hereafter the word "Privilege" will be used to refer to the phrase
"privilege against self-incrimination."
8 8 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
4. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.. .."
5 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Privilege is applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment:
We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from
compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the States.8
It would be incongruous to have different standards determine
the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prose-
cution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or
federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding
is justified. 7
In order to assess the effect of this holding, it should be a
simple matter to compare previous Nebraska holdings with
United States Supreme Court holdings and conclude that the one
most favorable to the individual person in each situation is now
the law of Nebraska. However, it is not quite as simple as it looks,
because there is relatively little law in Nebraska and because not
all of the federal law is clearly spelled out in Supreme Court
opinions. We shall therefore take up the various problems that
have arisen, indicating previous Nebraska law (if any), what
change is required by the Malloy holding, and also what doubts
remain. In doing this we will assume that only holdings of the
United States Supreme Court are specifically binding on state
supreme courts. Holdings of federal district courts or courts of
appeal may be persuasive authority, but no more.8
I. WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE?
A. There never seems to have been any question that the
Privilege prevented the government from calling the criminal de-
fendant as a witness on its case-in-chief.9
B. An individual person other than a criminal defendant
may be called as a witness by the government, or by any party
6 Id. at 6.
7 Id. at 11.
s Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, Inc., 146 Neb. 429, 19 N.W.2d 853
(1945); First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762 (1938);
Franklin v. Kelly, 2 Neb. 79 (1873).
In some areas, however, the Nebraska court has indicated that it
may consider the decisions of lower federal courts as binding. Sullivan
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 128 Neb. 92, 258 N.W. 38 (1934) (F.E.L.A.);
Robidoux v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 113 Neb. 682, 204 N.W. 870 (1925)
(I.C.C. Act); Preble v. Union Stock Yards Co., 110 Neb. 383, 193 N.W.
910 (1923) (F.E.L.A.); Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428
(1921) (Bankruptcy Act).
9 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2268, at 406.
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in a criminal or civil suit. He may then claim his Privilege
(assuming it is applicable) when asked any question.0 Under
Nebraska law such witness is required to claim this Privilege at
that time or it is waived. 1 The same is true by Supreme Court
decision.12 The extent of such waiver is not so clear and is
treated infra.13
The clear indication of Nebraska opinions is that the Privilege
thus claimed by a witness who is not a criminal defendant is not
considered to be based on the state constitution 14 but rather on its
statute.15 This is not an unusual holding, since it was not until
the latter half of the nineteenth century that courts began to think
of the mere witness's privilege as being constitutionally based
rather than as being simply a part of the common law. The
United States Supreme Court first held the witness's privilege to
be within the fifth amendment in Counselman v. Hitchcock'6 and
has since followed that holding in a number of cases.
Thus the Nebraska law is not changed in this area by applica-
tion of federal standards, but under Malloy Nebraska could not
change the rule in the future either by statute or judicial decision.
C. A corporation has no Privilege, either under Nebraska law
or federal law.17
D. An association such as a labor union has no Privilege
under federal law. Since the Privilege is a personal right, it can-
not belong to an impersonal, entity. 8 The United States Supreme
10 8 WiG MOR, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2268, at 402-03.
11 State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).
12 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See cases cited in 8
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2276.
13 See text accompanying notes 92-109 infra.
14 NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. "No person shall be compelled, in any crim-
inal case, to give evidence against himself .... " State ex rel. Beck
v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N.W.2d 695 (1959); State ex rel Wright v.
Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 272 N.W. 282 (1937).
15 Nk3. Ray. STAT. § 25-1210 (Reissue 1964) provides: "When the matter
sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable,
or to expose him to public ignominy, he is not compelled to answer,
except as provided in section 25-1214." Section 25-1214 permits im-
peachment of a witness by showing past conviction for a felony.
16 142 U.S. 547 (1892). For later cases see 8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note
3, § 2252.
17 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).
18 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944). "Respondent con-
tends that an officer of an unincorporated labor union possesses a
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Court has not yet spoken on the question of whether a partner-
ship is personal or impersonal in this context. It would be rea-
sonable to assume that this might be decided differently as to
different types of partnerships, as indeed it has in lower federal
courts.19 There is no prior Nebraska law.
E. However, under federal law an officer of a corporation or
an impersonal association can claim his own Privilege with respect
to the contents or whereabouts of corporate books and records not
in his possession which might incriminate him.20  There is no
prior Nebraska law.
F. Under federal law one individual cannot claim the Privi-
lege belonging to another, 21 except that an attorney may do so for
his absent client with respect to books and records belonging to
that client if the Privilege would have been applicable if asserted
by the client himself.22 There is no prior Nebraska law.
constitutional right to refuse to produce, in compliance with a sub-
poena duces tecum, records of the union which are in his custody and
which might tend to incriminate him .... We hold, however, that
neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment, both of which are di-
rected primarily to the protection of individual and personal rights,
requires the recognition of a privilege against self-incrimination under
the circumstances of this case.
"The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essen-
tially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals ....
"Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely person-
al one, it cannot be utilized by or.on behalf of any organization .... .
19 United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Silverstein, 237 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Liven
Service Council of New Jersey, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956).
20 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). "[H]e cannot lawfully
be compelled, in the absence of a grant of adequate immunity from
prosecution, to condemn himself by his own oral testimony." Id. at 124.
"The compulsory production of corporate or association records
by their custodian is readily justifiable, even though the custodian
protests against it for personal reasons, because he does not own the
records and has no legally cognizable interest in them. However, forc-
ing the custodian to testify orally as to the whereabouts of nonproduced
records requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind. He
might be compelled to convict himself out of his own mouth. That is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 128.
21 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
22 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). Reisman v. Cap-
lin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), implies the same result although it may also
be taken to require that the client should be a party or an intervenor.
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II. IN WHAT KINDS OF PROCEEDINGS MAY THE
PRIVILEGE BE CLAIMED?
A.. Under both Nebraska and federal law the Privilege may
be claimed in any judicial proceeding. 23
B. Under federal law the Privilege may be claimed in a legis-
lative investigation, that is in an investigation by a committee of
the legislature.2 4 There is no prior Nebraska law.
C. Under federal law the Privilege may be claimed in an
administrative investigation or proceeding.25 There is no prior
Nebraska law.
D. Historically it has not been applied, either under Nebraska
or federal law, to police investigations.2 6
With respect to C and I, certain additional observations are
pertinent:
1. On their face these statements of the law seem inconsis-
tent: Is not a police. investigation simply one kind of adminis-
trative investigation? Certainly the answer is yes; but the in-
vestigative methods are apt t.o be .quite different; the .sanctions
are therefore different; and so different constitutional, or other
protections of individual rights; come into play.
2. When one says that the Privilege does apply in an admin-
istrative investigation, what this means, is that the witness may
decline to answer a question at an administrative .hearing, and if
the Privilege is applicable, in the sense that the answer tends to
incriminate and is not waived, .the court Will not require an
answer when the usual proceeding to require an answer is brought
before it.
3. If resort to judicial sanctions Were the usual practice in
police investigations when the Privilege-was asserted; its applica-
tion would be the same-and so it is when the witness is brought
before a grand. jury.27  But the police -practice is more often
otherwise since a "witness" in a police investigation may be forced
23 8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2252, at 327.
24 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S: 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955). See 8 WIGMOR, op; cit. supra note, 3, § 2252, at
328.
25 ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1893); See 8 WiGmoRE, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 2252, at 328.
26 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2252, at 328-29.
27 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 4
to make incriminating statements through means other than court-
contempt sanctions. In this context the admissibility of such
statements at a later trial has been customarily dealt with under
the rules applied to exclude coerced confessions, and the cases
delineating those rules do not talk about the Privilege.
4. When the police investigative process was last considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Escobedo v. Illinois28
it was again not treated primarily in the terms of the Privilege
but rather in the terms of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
And yet underlying the right to counsel is the expected advice
from counsel that the witness-suspect has a right not to speak-
that is, he has the Privilege and cannot be forced to incriminate
himself. Presumably, therefore, this right not to incriminate him-
self is also applicable to any person being interrogated but who
has not acquired the right to counsel since he has not become an
accused in the police mind. The manner in which this right
will be enforced is of course one of the great problems confronting
police and prosecutors today. If he answers voluntarily, those
answers and the fruits thereof can be used against him. But if he
chooses to remain silent it is certainly conceivable that, contrary
to the present rule,29 his silence cannot be used against him.30
The Privilege was specifically referred to in Escobedo: "Our
Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of
the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his Privi-
lege against self-incrimination."31 Even the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice White makes the assumption that the United States
Constitution forbids police inquisitions which compel incrimina-
tion.32  And a similar approach is fairly evident in Malloy v.
Hogan where Mapp v. Ohio33 is cited for the proposition that the
fifth amendment Privilege against self-incrimination implemented
the fourth amendment (as was held- in Boyd v. United States34)
and that it secures "the right of a person to remain silent unless
28 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
29 State v. Worley, 178 Neb. 232, 134 N.W.2d 764 (1965). See Pierce v.
State, 173 Neb. 319, 113 N.W.2d 333 (1962).
30 Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (1965).
31 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964). Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958) was distinguished because there the individual had
been advised by the police of his "constitutional right to remain silent."
Id. at 491.
32 Id. at 498.
33 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. 835
It thus appears reasonably clear that the United States Su-
preme Court now considers the Privilege to be applicable in police
investigations. It is not, however, quite so clear what effect this
will have on the future course of the law. Even before these
cases the idea that coerced confessions were to be excluded solely
because they were untrustworthy was thoroughly repudiated for
both federal and state trials under due process theories.36 Prob-
ably a strict application of the usual Privilege and waiver of Privi-
lege rules would not go as far in keeping confessions out of the
trial as the due process and right to counsel rules do now.
At the same time this development can also be viewed as a
part of the continuing process of looking at the individual, in his
antagonistic relationship to his government, as having a bundle of
interrelated and complementary rights to be free from unfair
treatment, rather than as having a group of separate rights. The
future approach to these problems will be a unifying one, and
this may have quite definite effects at both the federal and state
levels on the progress of defining waiver (a Privilege concept) and
consent (a search and seizure concept), on the effect of the use of
trickery in the police investigative process, on the effect of some of
the more subtle (or less subtle) devices in administrative investi-
gations, on the full reach of McNabb v. United States,3 or on the
rules concerning wiretapping and eavesdropping.38 It can also be
expected to spell the end of the distinction, found in many states,
between confessions and admissions.39 This can hardly stand up
under the principles set out in Malloy and Escobedo.
III. WHAT DISCLOSURES ARE COVERED?
A. ORDINARY TESTinONY
It is likely that at this point the Nebraska and federal law
may be thought farthest apart, and that here Malloy may have its
35 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
36 See the discussion in Malloy, Id. at 6-9.
37 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
38 This was already demonstrated in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), and the strength of On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952), must surely be waning. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, 85 Sup. Ct. 1246 "(1965).
&9 8 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 3, § 2266. "The right of confrontation
has now also been added to that bundle of individual rights protected
by the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065
(1965).
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most significant impact. We are using the word "law" (as
applied in Nebraska) in the somewhat loose sense of "accepted
usage" of the bar and bench since we have been unable to find
any Nebraska case that clearly pinpoints the kind of statement
that will be held to fall within the Nebraska Constitution or
statute.
The federal law has undergone a significant change during
the past fifteen years. Prior to 1951 the leading Supreme Court
decision was Mason v. United States40 in which it was held that
the fear of incrimination as a result of the disclosure not only had
to be reasonable, but also had to be made to appear so to the
judge. The decision was a judicial one.
In 1951, however, the Supreme Court handed down the now
controlling decision in Hoffman v. United States.41  Although
lip service is paid to the idea that the decision of what incriminates
must be made by the judge rather than by the witness, the stand-
ard to be applied is more stringent. Before rejecting the claim
of Privilege the judge must be satisfied that in the total complex
of circumstances there is no possibility of incrimination. 42  And
later decisions have made it clear that a very slight possibility
will suffice to support the claim of Privilege.
43
Similarly the concept of what is meant by "incriminate" has
been enlarged. It is not limited to a disclosure of an essential
element of a crime, but clearly has been applied to any fact which
might furnish a clue to other evidence leading inferentially to
proof of a criminal act or a part of a criminal act.44 Nor is it
limited to the possibility of conviction-apparently any possibility
of prosecution, whether such would seem successful at the moment
or not, is included.45
In certain situations the fear will not be upheld. If the
individual claiming the Privilege has been convicted or acquitted
of the crime or has been pardoned, or if the statute of limitations
has run, there can be no further incrimination.46 Also, an effec-
tive grant of immunity from prosecution will suffice to do away
40 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
41 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
42 Id. at 468; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 580 (1892).
43 See 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2260 n.9.
44 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 2260.
45 8 WIGMORE, p. cit. supra-note 3, § 2260.
46 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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with the Privilege. This matter is discussed at more length
below.47 And of course it is always possible to argue that the
Nebraska statute48 extends the Privilege farther than the fifth
amendment, since the -witness is protected from disclosing any-
thing that will expose him to public ignominy-a phrase that has
never been construed by the Nebraska court. It is true that sev-
eral justices of the United States Supreme Court have expressed
themselves in favor of extending the fifth amendment Privilege
in a similar way to include social and economic as well as penal
consequences; 49 but this does not at the moment appear likely to
be accepted by a majority of the court.
B. PHYsicAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. Passive Disclosures
There is little dispute that any person, whether the defendant
or a mere witness, may be forced to disclose his obvious physical
characteristics for identification, in order to suggest his capabilities
or his age, or for any other relevant reason. He may even be
required to demonstrate that certain clothes fit him.60
The courts have also found no problem in requiring an ac-
cused to surrender his clothing for examination (usually shoes,
to see if they fit tracks) and subsequently admitting this evidence
at his trial.51 And fingerprinting or photographing have always
been held outside of the Privilege.52
2. Active Disclosures
The rationale of the decisions referred to in (1), when not
based on waiver, is generally based on the idea that the Privilege
protects only against testimonial disclosures; that is, a communica-
tion of a person's knowledge. Hence there is some judicial hesi-
tancy to deny the application of the Privilege when the dis-
closure of physical characteristics or capabilities does involve ac-
47 See text accompanying notes 110-130 infra.
48 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1210 (Reissue 1964).
4" See Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in which Mr. Justice Black concurred
in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956) (dissenting
opinion); Mr. Justice Field's *opinion in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
628 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
50 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2265, at 394.
51 Krens v. State, 75 Neb. 294, 106 N.W. 27 (1905). See generally 8
WiumoRE, op cit. supra note 3, § 2265, at 394.
52 8 WzGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3,. § 2265, .at 387.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 4
tion on the part of an accused-as where he is required to walk
or talk or write,53 and even though the specific words used are
not assertive of guilty facts. Unfortunately neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the Nebraska Supreme Court has
spoken authoritatively on this question.
3. Extraction of body fluids
If the theory that the Privilege applies only to testimonial
communications is to be logically applied, the Privilege should not
bar the extraction; and use at trial, of body fluids, and this has
certainly been the rule held by a large majority of the state
courts, including Nebraska.5 4
Again we must note that the United States Supreme Court
has not spoken on the precise issue.5 5 Although prior to Malloy
the federal Privilege had not been held applicable to the states,
still the Court had held that some forcible extraction of body
fluids by state officers violated due process.5 6 It refused, however,
in Breithaupt v. Abram57 to include in this category the taking of
blood from an unconscious person. If the extraction involved a
violation of fourth amendment concepts, as would be the case of
an extraction in connection with an illegal arrest, it would of
course be inadmissable under Mapp.58 It may also be seriously
questioned whether the extraction of body fluids does not come
within the scope of Escobedo,5 9 requiring the exclusion of evi-
dence thus obtained unless the suspect-defendant had been given
the right to consult counsel.
When state courts have been presented with this issue, it has
usually been in the context of a "drunk driving" statute. These
statutes are upheld either on the theory that the state can require
an individual using its highways to consent to a body fluid test,
or on the theory that the extraction of body fluids is not the
forcing of a communication and so is not protected under the
Privilege." In Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles0 ' the
53 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2265, at 395-99.
54 Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75
(1961); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2265, at 391.
55 But see Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) discussed in text
accompanying note 64 infra.
G6 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
57 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
58 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
59 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
60 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1013 (1956).
61 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961).
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Nebraska court used both theories.
Each of these theories can be supported indirectly by United
States Supreme Court holdings. The consent theory is certainly
a part of the reasoning underlying the required records doctrine.0 2
It should be noted, however, that this argument is not the same as
that of voluntary consent. If the driver suspected of having been
drinking voluntarily consents to the extraction of his body fluids,
it would seem clear-Escobedo issues to one side-that the Privi-
lege is waived, just as fourth amendment protections may be
waived by voluntary consent to a police search. 3 But Escobedo
cannot, of course, be thus easily forgotten, and the voluntariness
of the consent may clearly be negated by the fact that the "con-
sent" in a particular case was forced under the threat of losing
one's license to drive.
The limitation of the Privilege to testimonial communications
was stated by Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States,"4 a case in
which it was held not a violation of the Privilege to require de-
fendant, before trial, to put on a blouse and have a witness testify
at trial that it fitted. However, the strength of this case as a pre-
cedent is substantially blunted by the fact that Justice Holmes also
suggested that such evidence was admissible even though it was
secured in violation of a constitutional right0 5 The court in Weeks
v. United States60 (decided after Holt) held that the trial use of
evidence illegally obtained did violate the Privilege, and its trial
use was barred if defendant properly moved to suppress it before
trial. On the other hand, the federal courts of appeal have regu-
larly cited Holt to sustain, against the claim of the Privilege, the
securing of evidence involving the body of the defendant.0 7 But
62 Discussed at note 139 infra.
03 See, e.g., United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965).
04 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
65 Id. at 253: "Moreover, we need not consider how far a court would
go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes too far,
the evidence, if material, is competent. Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S. 585."
66 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
07 Roberson v. United States, 282 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1960) (defendant
forced to stand in court for identification); Bryant v. United States,
244 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1957) (specimens of handwriting-doubted to
violate fifth amendment under Holt, but held proper because volun-
tarily given); United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956)(heroin taken from defendant's car); United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d
788 (7th Cir. 1955) (fingerprints); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d
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in view of the present approach of the court, interweaving all of
the constitutional protections, it cannot be said that the use of
force (actual or constructive) to secure something other than
mere identifying evidence will not be held to violate a suspect's
constitutional rights.
One other facet of this problem is also worth noting. It is not
impossible to conceive that a distinction may be drawn between
using body fluid evidence in a criminal case for drunken driving
or motor vehicle homicide and a proceeding to revoke a driver's
license for failure to submit to the test. The latter can be
viewed as not involving a criminal penalty, and therefore the
Privilege is not violated. It is true that the Privilege applies in
any proceeding, whether criminal or not, but only if a criminal
penalty may be applied. Since, however, at the time the test is
sought a criminal penalty is a not unlikely possibility, the driver
would be within his rights in claiming the Privilege-assuming it
will be held to apply. If the state thereafter revokes his driver's
license, this action would seem to involve a penalty for properly
claiming his constitutional rights, and the Court has regularly
refused to permit this in recent years.08
4. Psychiatric Tests
Obviously the problem of psychiatric tests differs from the
other kinds of disclosures considered above in that it will invari-
ably involve conscious communication and would therefore be
classified within the general kind of disclosures covered by the
Privilege. There appears to be no United States Supreme Court
case specifically covering the problem. In Nebraska, the court
stated in Wehenkel v. State"9 that a psychiatrist could testify as
398 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (on issue of sanity jury can observe defendant,
dictum); Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (de-
fendant's hair dyed for identification); Swingle v. United States, 151
F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1945) (defendant can be forced to give his name);
McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (blood found
on defendant's person).
Two federal cases do deny application of the Privilege to things
extracted from a person's body. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1957) (medically supervised extraction of narcotics from
defendant's anus where he had secreted it was held not to violate the
fourth amendment, nor due process; and the Privilege was held not
applicable under Holt); United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758(D.D.C. 1954) (urine test for alcohol did not violate Privilege under
Holt).
68 Griffin v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229, 1232-33 (1965).
69 116 Neb. 493, 218 N.W. 137 (1928).
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to the sanity of the accused, based upon an examination requested
by the county attorney, on the theory that the accused had not
objected. It should be remembered, however, that such an exami-
nation made without the advice of counsel would now undoubtedly
violate the principle of Escobedo70 and Massiah.71 Where indi-
gent and non-indigent defendants are treated differently it would
also violate due process and equal protection.
72
The following comments seem pertinent:
a. From time to time courts and writers have advanced
various justifications for the rule that a psychiatric examination of
a criminal defendant will not violate his Privilege. None is com-
pletely satisfactory. Obviously a defendant who freely and vol-
untarily submits himself to such an examination after having con-
sulted with counsel may be held to have waived his Privilege.
But the question seldom has arisen in that kind of clear cut
case. If there were no consultation with counsel it would un-
doubtedly violate Escobedo7 3 and any form of compulsion would
probably also violate Malloy,7 4 unless a psychiatric examination
is to be treated differently from other forms of verbal communi-
cations.
b. The usual reason given for such a differentiation is some
form of waiver. If a defendant wishes to raise the defense of
insanity he must consent to be examined by a psychiatrist on be-
half of the state. Whether such a condition would today be
called a "compulsion" is debatable. Of course, it is difficult to
imagine how else the state could get intelligent psychiatric diag-
nosis; and yet in no other kind of defense is it suggested that the
defendant must agree to speak for himself.
70 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). It must, of course, be noted
that the precise meaning of Escobedo still remains to be settled.
Nebraska, in line with the majority of state decisions, has required
that the accused request counsel at the investigatory stage. State v.
Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965); State v. Worley, 178
Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965). But once an information is filed,
more is required-the accused must be told of his right to counsel
and that one will be supplied him if he cannot pay for one himself.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S; 201 (1964); State v. Snell, 177 Neb.
396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
71 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
72 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See 15 STAN. L. REv. 538 (1963);1964 Wis. L. REV. 671.
73 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
74 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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If the defendant himself testifies to facts from which an in-
ference of insanity at the time of the act is possible, he would be
subject to cross-examination, his privilege would be waived, and
it would be within waiver principles to require him to submit to a
psychiatric examination on behalf of the state. If he seeks to do
substantially the same thing by asking his own psychiatrist to
report as a witness what defendant told him, it would not be
unreasonable to call this also a waiver. One does, however, en-
counter timing problems since this would involve taking a con-
tinuance to conduct the state's psychiatric examination. 5
In the majority of states the defendant has some burden to
come forward with evidence to show his insanity. It is perhaps
arguable that if, to support this burden, he uses an expert of his
own who only reports his opinion and not what defendant told
him, the state will have the right to cross-examine that expert;
75 In State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965), the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that with possible limitations a psychiatric exam-
ination of a criminal defendant, ordered by the trial court after de-
fendant had disclosed his intention to rely on the defense of insanity
and incompetence to stand trial, does not violate the Privilege. The
court established a series of safeguards for all such examinations in
New Jersey designed to limit the nature and extent of the examina-
tion to such as may be determined by the psychiatrist to be necessary
for proper diagnosis. The defendant is given the right to have his
own experts but not his lawyer present at the examination by the
state appointed psychiatrist. The state psychiatrist, when testifying
at trial, can report fully what the defendant told him including the
circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act, although the jury
will be instructed twice that they can consider such testimony on the
issue of sanity only and not on the issue of guilt. The Privilege is
found not applicable because it would be "anomalous," and would
"balance the competing interests unfairly and disproportionately
against the public." The court perhaps also rested on some theory of
waiver. The waiver theory is most obviously applicable if it is as-
sumed, as the court does, that the defense psychiatrist could report
what defendant told him in support of his opinion. This permits the
defendant to get his own story before the jury, and long standing
principles of waiver should permit the state to attack that story with
its own experts and report it to the jury if it chooses to do so, just
as it could do by cross-examination if the defendant himself took the
stand. The court is obviously limited in the sanctions available to
force defendant to cooperate with the state psychiatrist. If he is
uncooperative the court provides that the testimony of the defense
expert will be limited-at the least he will not be permitted to report
what the defendant told him. Whether there are to be further limi-
tations is ambiguous: "If a defendant is capable mentally of cooperat-
ing to the extent deemed necessary by the doctors, and he fails or
refuses to do so, on motion of the State the defense psychiatric testi-
mony shall be limited to the same extent." Id. at -, 210 A.2d at 775.
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the state cannot do so without its own psychiatric examination;
failing that, the defendant's expert's examination-in-chief will be
stricken. But this is still a condition.
c. Professor Weihofen has taken the view that a psychiatric
examination is no different from any other kind of physical ex-
amination-it is not within the Privilege because it is not testi-
monial.76 A psychiatrist's consideration of what the defendant
tells him is no different from any observation of objective phy-
sical characteristics of a patient. He is not interested in the truth
of the utterances but only in the totality of what they reveal about
the patient's mental normality or abnormality. So long, there-
fore, as the psychiatrist only uses what the patient told him as
the basis for his medical opinion as to sanity (whatever legal
sense is applied) and does not repeat on the witness stand what
the defendant told him, he is not using the defendant's utterances
testimonially and so has not violated his Privilege. The difficulty,
however, with this analysis is that recent court decisions consider
the Privilege as representing an absolute right to remain silent.77
d. Professor Inbau's position is perhaps similar, but he would
not go quite as far as Professor Weihofen3 8 He would limit the
psychiatrist's examination to matters not directly connected with
the alleged criminal act. If that were the limit of the examina-
tion, the Privilege is not violated because the utterances were not
connected with the act about which criminality is charged. Other-
wise the Privilege would be violated. This theory unfortunately
runs contrary to the United States Supreme Court holding in
Hoffman 79 that any compelled disclosure of information which
might be a clue to some incriminating factor is within the Privi-
lege. The significant incriminating factor is of course the mental
condition of the defendant at the time he did the act in question.
e. The Wigrnore-McNaughton position is simply that the Priv-
ilege does not apply because it is not testimonial-there is no real
discussion of the problem.80
f. The Model Penal Code takes a position much like that of
Weihofen.81 It assumes that the report of the court-appointed
76 WEiHoFEN, MENTAL DisOaDER AS A Ciumv=AL DEFENSE, 293-96 (1954).
7 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also text accompanying
note 26 supra.
78 INBAU, SELF-INcMIMINATION 52-61 (1950).
79 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
80 8 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2265, at 399.
81 WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 76, at 293-96.
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psychiatrist would not violate the Privilege so long as he does not
repeat at the trial anything told him by the defendant which
would constitute an admission of guilt of the crime charged.
And it limits the report of any other statement made by the
defendant to the issue of mental condition.
82
Again, the fact remains that the issue of mental competency
is an integral part of the concept of criminality, and the code so
states.8 3 However, the code also assumes that the defendant, al-
though committed for examination and diagnosis, may refuse to
cooperate . 4 There is no apparent sanction against such refusal,
except that it may be so reported at the trial. 85 That itself might
violate the rule against comment on the failure to take the stand,
or the claim of Privilege. 6 If the defendant did cooperate with
the psychiatrist, the principle of waiver could be applied if there
had been no compulsion and if there had been adequate advice
of counsel.81
g. For the same reasons suggested above, the mere use of a
separate trial on the issue of mental competency would not
avoid the application of the Privilege,8 8 if it is applicable at all.
h. The problem has also arisen in a number of cases involving
commitment for mental illness or for sexual psychopathy. Here
the almost unanimous holding is that the Privilege has no applica-
tion because the commitment is not penal.8 9 If the facts dis-
closed in no way relate to any crime, or at least to any crime for
which the individual might later be prosecuted, then such a hold-
ing is obviously correct. Were this a matter of first impression,
82 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.09 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962). See also 18
U.S.C. § 4244 (1958), which provides for psychiatric diagnosis by court
appointed psychiatrist on issue of insanity at time of trial. It is also
specifically provided that anything said by defendant to a psychiatrist
is inadmissible on issue of guilt.
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05(3) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07(4) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962): A psychi-
atrist "shall be permitted to make a statement as to the nature of his
examination .... "
86 See text accompanying note 142 infra.
87 Query: What advice of counsel can be adequate if the person deprived
is mentally incompetent?
88 See 15 STAN. L. REv. 538 (1963) for a discussion of the use of this
device in some states.
89 Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948); State v. Madary,
178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583 (1965); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
See also State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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one might argue that involuntary incarceration in a mental insti-
tution is penal in nature; but this seems clearly foreclosed by
judicial decisions. 90 On the other hand, if there is a forced dis-
closure of some criminal acts for which the individual might be
prosecuted the mere fact that it was sought to be brought out
in a non-criminal proceeding would not take it out of the fifth
amendment Privilege.91
IV. WAIVER
A. We have already suggested that the Privilege does not
apply when there is no possibility of prosecution, as by an
acquittal or conviction of the crime, by the running of the statute
of limitations, or by a pardon.
92
B. We have also suggested that there may be an implied
waiver in certain circumstances. The mere failure to object
may also be construed as a waiver.93 At least this is the holding
in the federal courts94 and also in Nebraska,95 except on the
specific point that the prosecution cannot call the defendant as
its witness in his criminal trial.
C. When the defendant voluntarily takes the stand in his
own defense, this is generally held to waive any objection he
might make to otherwise proper cross-examination. The precise
extent of such a waiver is variously stated. In Nebraska the
waiver is clearly extended to the substantive fact issues about
which he testified 5 and to the showing of convictions of past
crimes97 (which would not be covered by the Privilege) but not to
90 Compare One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 85 Sup. Ct. 1246
(1965), holding a "civil" forfeiture proceeding to be sufficiently crim-
inal in nature to permit the application of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
91 People v. Cornelius, 392 m. 599, 65 N.E.2d 439 (1946); cf. United States
v. Andreadis, 234 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). See text accompany-
ing note 10 supra.
92 See note 46 supra.
93 See note 11 supra.
94 Rogers v. United States, 370 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931).
95 State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).
96 Grandsinger v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955); Griffith v.
State, 157 Neb. 448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953); Seiner v. State, 138 Neb.
130, 292 N.W. 112 (1940).
97 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1214 (Reissue 1964), provides that a witness may
be interrogated as to previous convictions for felonies. This rule ap-
plies to a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf. Grand-
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other prior criminal acts offered on the theory that they would
impeach.98
D. A problem of waiver which has never received much
judicial consideration is involved in determining the admissibility
of a confession. The question is to what extent does a defendant
waive his Privilege by voluntarily testifying solely as to the cir-
cumstances surrounding his alleged confession or admission. Of
course he waives the Privilege to the extent of those circumstances,
and he may be cross-examined thereon, but there has been very
little authority as to further waiver. What there is supports the
proposition that he does not waive so as to be cross-examined
about the crime or so as to be later subject to being called as a
witness by the state.99
The case of Jackson v. Denno'00 brought the problem to the
forefront by forcing a number of states to reconsider their pro-
cedural rules with respect to determining the admissibility and
weight of confessions and admissions. The Jackson case held that
fourteenth amendment due process requires a separate judge
determination of admissibility. In a footnote the court supported
its other reasons for this holding by suggesting that a defendant
would be deterred from testifying on the issue of coercion if he
feared impeachment or cross-examination before the jury.10 1 Fol-
lowing Jackson several states have made it clear that the defend-
ant may testify before the judge on this issue without waiving
his Privilege,102 but none has yet dealt with the question of
singer v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955); Latham v. State,
152 Neb. 113, 40 N.W.2d 522 (1949); Denker v. State, 106 Neb. 779, 184
N.W. 945 (1921).
98 Garcia v. State, 159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955); Crawford v. State,
116 Neb. 629, 218 N.W. 421 (1928); Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214
N.W. 256 (1927); cf. O'Connor v. State, 123 Neb. 471, 243 N.W. 650(1932); Redmon v. State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948), modified
in Sherrick v. State, 157 Neb. 623, 61 N.W.2d 358 (1953).
99 Brown v. State, 111 Neb. 486, 196 N.W. 926 (1924) (dictum); Cross v.
State, 142 Tenn. 510, 221 S.W. 489 (1920). The paucity of authority
may be due to the fact that it is assumed he does not waive, or it
may be that in such cases the defendant ordinarily testifies voluntarily
as to the crime.
100 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
101 Id. at 389 n.16.
102 State v. Burke, - Wis. -, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965); People v. Walker,
- Mich. -, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965); Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345
(Tex. Cr. App. 1964). The New York Court of Appeals failed to con-
sider the problem in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179,
255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
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whether after the judge has found no coercion, the defendant can,
without waiving his Privilege, testify before the jury for the
purpose of affecting the weight to be given his reported state-
ments, or whether his testimony before the judge can be read to
the jury for the same purpose without a waiver.
E. If we are dealing with a mere witness, as opposed to the
defendant on trial, a voluntary disclosure of some incriminating
facts should have a similar waiver effect, although the matter is
hardly free from doubt. In Rogers v. United States'0 3 the witness
was before a grand jury, and the waiver was held to apply to a
question which the Court found could not require an answer
which would place the witness in greater jeopardy than she had
already exposed herself to. In Brown v. United States,10 4 how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court went much farther and
held that the opening up of an area waived the Privilege for a
thorough investigation on cross-examination even though the or-
iginal testimony did not disclose any incriminating information-it
was merely a denial of any criminal facts. 05
It is anomalous to note that while the United States Supreme
Court has been lenient in favor of the individual when inter-
preting the Privilege, it has been far from lenient on the issue of
waiver. As a matter of fact this position on waiver is often
blamed for the excessive leniency of cases following Hoffman v.
United States'0 6 because a witness can never be sure how far the
waiver will extend. 0 7
F. Two other general propositions are clear under federal
decisions. If a witness waives the Privilege in one proceeding he
may claim it in a different proceeding.'08 But the report of a
disclosure previously made (as at a grand jury or preliminary
103 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
104 356 U.S. 148 (1958). See Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 830 (1960).
:105 But compare Coil v. United States, 343 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1965). In
a narcotics case a government witness testified to the purchase
of morphine from defendant. On cross-examination he was asked
about two other instances involving the purchase of narcotics and for
which he was then charged in the state court. His claim of Privilege
was upheld since the point was relevant only on the issue of his
credibility, nor was it necessary to strike his direct examination.
106 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
107 For a recognition of this see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1964).
108 8 WiGmonE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2276(4), at 470-72. See Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 1403 (1954).
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hearing) may be admitted at a trial.10 9 There is no prior Ne-
braska holding.
V. IMMUNITY STATUTES
A. In order to avoid the claim of Privilege, the federal gov-
ernment and the states have adopted the device of enforced
waiver by a grant of immunity from prosecution. In order to
satisfy the limitations of the fifth amendment the United States
Supreme Court early held that the immunity must be complete. 01
An early statute which merely provided that the testimony given
by a witness could not be used against him in any future criminal
proceeding was held not adequate to provide the complete protec-
tion required by the Privilege."' A later statute which provided
that the witness could not be prosecuted for any crime he was
thus required to disclose was held sufficient protection." 2
These immunity bath statutes are quite numerous and are
applicable under varying circumstances. So far as the federal
government is concerned it is clear that the Privilege must be
originally applicable and must be specifically claimed by the wit-
ness. 113 Some statutes then leave the discretion to order dis-
closure and grant immunity to the judge or other presiding
officer (in an administrative or legislative examination) while
others require specific authorization from some other executive
officer to grant immunity." 4 Our research has not disclosed any
Nebraska decision under such statutes.
For many years practical difficulties have arisen when dis-
closures to one sovereign government have involved facts incrimi-
nating under the statutes of another. The underlying theory ap-
plied by the United States Supreme Court was usually thought to
hold that the Privilege was limited to the particular sovereign
body-sovereign A was not required to protect a witness before it
109 8 WIGMoaR, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2276(5), at 472-74. This statement
obviously assumes that the hearsay rule can be circumvented. If the
previous statement happens to be that of the defendant on trial the
exception for declaration of the opposing party applies. Note, how-
ever, that the defendant's testimony at a preliminary examination
cannot be used against him at trial if he was not represented by
counsel. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); State v. Snell, 177
Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
110 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
11 Ibid.
112 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
113 8 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2282, at 515-19.
114 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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from incriminating himself under the statutes of sovereign B.115
And thus an immunity statute was only required to cover subse-
quent action by the same sovereign. Not all of the states agreed
with this theory under their own constitutional provisions. 116
As applied prior to 1964, the following propositions were es-
tablished by United States Supreme Court decisions:
1. The federal government could, under the supremacy clause,
prevent state use of information forced by the federal govern-
ment.
11 7
2. It did so by preventing use of the precise testimony." 8
3. It could, and did in several areas, prevent state prosecu-
tion for state crimes disclosed by a witness's forced testimony.
That is, the federal government had the power to grant immunity
from state prosecution if Congress determined it was necessary to
do so "for the more effective exercise of a granted power.""' 9
4. Congress did not, however, have to do so.' 20
5. A state grant of immunity could not bar federal prosecu-
tion for federal crimes disclosed in state proceedings.' 2'
B. It is true that several United States Supreme Court de-
cisions showed clear indications of dissatisfaction with these
rules, and in a decision handed down the same day as Malloy
the dissatisfied judges won the battle. Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York 122  overruled Feldman v. United
States. 23  The specific holding in Feldman was that the federal
government could use information obtained from disclosures forced
from the now federal defendant by the State of New York under
a grant of immunity from New York prosecution. Murphy, how-
ever, was not before the Court on the issue of whether the federal
government could use the information forced by New Jersey; the
question was whether New Jersey could punish Murphy for re-
fusing to answer questions which incriminated him under federal
115 8 WIGmOPE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2258.
116 See cases cited in 8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2258 n.6.
117 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
118 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
119 Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 511 (1960).
120 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
121 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
122 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
123 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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law.124 Since such compelled disclosure would (under the Murphy
holding) violate the fifth amendment, the Court could have
applied one of two possible sanctions: The state could never
force such testimony or the federal government could not use it.
The Court chose the latter rule, thus permitting the state to get
vital information and leaving the federal government in no worse
position than if the information had never been forthcoming.
But, in following language in Counselman they articulated a rule
less strict than has usually been provided in immunity statutes.
The federal government is not barred from prosecuting the wit-
ness so forced to testify by the state if it can prove that its evi-
dence is not the fruit of the poisoned tree-that is, that it had an
"independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence."'1 25
As is so often the case, Murphy leaves several questions un-
answered. It might, for example, permit Congress to change the
effect of various immunity statutes. However, the handling of
the Counseiman case in Murphy does leave some doubt as to
whether the federal government could itself question witness X
under immunity and subsequently prosecute X for a crime he then
disclosed, even though all the evidence used at the trial was se-
cured before the questioning. Mr. Justice White's concurring
opinion was directed specifically at the question of the meaning of
Counseiman, and he was not willing to go so far.12 6
One may also ask what has become of United States v. Mur-
dock 12 7 in which the Court had required a witness to answer a
federal inquiry over the objection that he might disclose facts
incriminating under Illinois law. Mr. Justice Goldberg, (in Mur-
phy) speaking for four judges, certainly went as far as one could
go in disapproving that decision without specifically overruling it,
which of course he did not have to do.128 Since Congress can, and
has in many areas, granted immunity from state as well as federal
prosecution this may not be a very pressing problem; but at least
it seems likely that the Court will hold that state immunity must
124 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), held the state could do so.
125 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18
(1964).
126 Id. at 92, 104-07.
127 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
128 "[W]e now accept as correct the construction given the privilege by
the English courts .... We reject-as unsupported by history or
policy-the deviation from that construction only recently adopted by
this Court in United States v. Murdock . . . and Feldman v. United
States . . . " 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964).
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come from somewhere. Perhaps in this area it will be enough if
Congress were to pass a general act granting immunity to the
extent of the fruit of the poisoned tree doctrine. Or if not, the
Court itself may require a state to exclude any poisoned fruit.
C. Interstate application of Murphy: None of the cases in
the United States Supreme Court has yet dealt with the perhaps
more complicated problem of the right of a witness in State A
to decline to answer questions which might incriminate him under
the laws of State B. It does, however, seem reasonably clear that
the theory of both Murphy and Malloy can only lead to the con-
clusion that a witness does now have that right. According to
these cases the Privilege is to be applied uniformly according to
federal standards, and the underlying historical and policy factors
supporting Murdock and Feldman are repudiated.1 29 If this be
so it establishes law in Nebraska which had not been determined
before and which presumably had been thought to be otherwise.
It still remains to be determined how the immunity doctrine
will be implemented at the interstate level. Presumably the
United States Supreme Court would approve permitting Nebraska
to force a witness to disclose facts incriminating under the law of
Iowa if Iowa could make no use of that disclosure either directly
or indirectly under the same formula as that applied against the
federal government in Murphy. It is conceivable, of course, that
each state could enact legislation to provide precisely such limita-
tions, but practical politics suggest that such uniformity of state
action within a reasonable length of time is a dream.
It is much more feasible to spell out such a provision from the
federal level. This could come before the United States Supreme
Court in much the same way that the Murphy case came up, and
there is no reason to suppose that a single case would not be
sufficient to establish a rule which would be uniform throughout
the country. Whether the Court would adopt such a rule as
opposed to merely prohibiting Nebraska from forcing the dis-
closure of Iowa criminality at all would undoubtedly depend on
its being persuaded that the same reason applied at the interstate
level as was found applicable in Murphy at the state-federal level.
The reason was that New Jersey's investigation would benefit
New Jersey and would not place the federal government in any
substantially worse position than if there had been no New Jersey
disclosure.. The federal government is obviously in a somewhat
worse position since it must bear the burden of proving that none
129 Ibid.
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of its evidence is tainted-and the same would be true of Iowa at
the interstate level. It might be that the different nature of
state criminal laws would lead to the conclusion that Iowa's burden
would be unreasonable when compared with the advantage to
Nebraska, or that this is a decision that Iowa should make rather
than the United States Supreme Court. Or it might also be con-
cluded that the effect of Nebraska's disclosure on Iowa's impetus
to prosecute would be more significant at the interstate level.
In any event, it cannot be assumed that the United States Supreme
Court would make the same choice of alternatives it did in
Murphy.
It is also possible to establish an effective rule by Congres-
sional action, which would be permitted under section five of the
fourteenth amendment.130  This approach might well be more
politically palatable: It would provide every state an opportunity
to be represented in the decision; and it would permit the formu-
lation of a rule within acceptable limits, such as one making the
type of crime being investigated or disclosed significant.
VI. APPLICATION TO DOCUMENTS
Here again there appears to be a dearth of Nebraska au-
thority. There is no dearth of federal authority, but it can
hardly be said to be entirely clear.
A. We start with the basic proposition that the Privilege
protects a person from being forced to produce self-incriminating
documents that are possessed and owned by him in his personal
capacity-that is, he may properly object to complying with a
subpoena duces tecuM. 13 1 Documents may, however, be secured
by the state through search and seizure which complies with
fourth amendment limitations. 13 2 Documents secured by a seizure
which does not comply with fourth amendment limitations will
be excluded at trial (of the person from whom they are seized) as
violating the Privilege.
3 3
B. Documents which are not possessed and owned in a per-
son's individual capacity, but which are in fact the property of a
corporation, or some similarly impersonal entity, may be secured
130 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 5.
131 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
132 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2264, at 380.
133 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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by subpoena duces tecum, but the possessor may not be required
to testify with respect to them or their whereabouts if the docu-
ments or the testimony will incriminate him. 3 4 Nor may the
corporation object since the Privilege does not apply to such
entities.135
Documents possessed by A which belong to B (an individual)
may incriminate either A or B. If they incriminate B it is gen-
erally assumed that B is not protected by the Privilege.'3" How-
ever, if A is B's attorney then a combinati6n of B's attorney-client
privilege and his self-incrimination privilege should prevent dis-
closure if B himself could not be forced to produce them.1'3
If such documents incriminate A, it is clear that A is being
forced to incriminate himself by producing them in answer to a
subpoena or other order. But if the government could get them
through B, or through a replevin action or the like by B if neces-
sary, the implications of some federal cases are that A cannot
successfully claim his Privilege.138 The matter is hardly, however,
free from doubt, and the doubts are substantially greater when
both A and B would be incriminated.
C. Required records: In 1948 the United States Supreme
Court established one further rule with respect to documents: It
is not a violation of the Privilege to force disclosure of records
required by law to be kept, insofar as those records are reasonably
necessary to help enforce a law constitutionally regulating or pro-
hibiting a particular activity. 39 Although the rule had many
state cases to support it 140 (none so far as we can find in Ne-
braska) the commentators have had a great deal of difficulty
supporting it in theory and have differed widely in the reasons
which they find appealing. Some of these reasons are: The docu-
ments have somehow become "public"; the individual has con-
134 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
135 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
136 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 2259, 2264.
137 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) uses language to the con-
trary, but there the papers were not shown to belong to client B. See
also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), sug-
gesting that B might under some circumstances be protected by the
fourth amendment.
18 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); United States v.
Field, 190 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1951).
139 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
140 8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2259 (c), at 363.
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sented by his application for a license; he has impliedly waived
the Privilege because he knew what would be required in the
way of reports or records; if the government can prohibit an act,
anything less than prohibition is valid; the sentiments underlying
the Privilege are not very strong, when compared with the public
necessity. Two courts of appeal have refused to apply the rule to
a required report of a single illegal transaction as distinguished
from the regular and continuing business entries involved in
Shapiro v. United States.141
VII. COMMENT ON EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE
Nebraska, by statute,'142 specifically provides that no comment
shall be made on the criminal defendant's refusal to testify. The
federal statutes contain a provision similarly construed,143 as well
as a provision giving the defendant the right to have the jury
instructed that his refusal to testify shall not be considered against
him. The United States Supreme Court now holds that the fifth
and fourteenth amendments bar any comment by the prosecutor
on the accused's silence or any instruction by the judge that
silence may be taken as evidence of guilt.144
141 335 U.S. 1 (1948). See Dugan v. United States, 341 F.2d 85 (7th Cir.
1965); Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962). But the
Ninth Circuit itself, and others, have limited the holding. See, e.g.,
Frye v. United States, 315 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 849 (1963); Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963).
The distinction between being tried for the crime of not registering
a gun (Privilege sustained) and for the crime of possessing a non-
registered gun (Privilege denied) seems hardly worthy of a major
constitutional issue. And it fails to note that, at the time of not reg-
istering, prosecution for either crime is a possibility.
142 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2011 (Reissue 1964).
143 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1952). See cases collected construing this statute in
8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2272 n.2.
144 Griffin v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965). See also Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), holding that an accused's silence
before the grand jury cannot be shown at his trial to impeach his
trial testimony since that constitutionally guaranteed right to remain
silent cannot be taken as inconsistent with his trial testimony denying
criminal conduct.
